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Abstract: We examine the following consequentialist view of virtue: a trait is a virtue if and only if 
it has good consequences in some relevant way. We highlight some motivations for this basic 
account, and offer twelve choice points for filling it out. Next, we explicate Julia Driver’s 
consequentialist view of virtue in reference to these choice points, and we canvass its merits and 
demerits. Subsequently, we consider three suggestions that aim to increase the plausibility of her 
position, and critically analyze them. We conclude that one of those proposed revisions would 
improve her account. 
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Many philosophers would agree that a tenable comprehensive ethical theory must provide an 
account of virtue and vice that is consistent with the theory’s broader commitments (cf. 
Hursthouse 1999: 1-5), because ethics is not only about what we should do but is about what we 
should be. Consequentialism is no exception.1 Consequentialist moral theories are those that 
make ethical properties such as right action and virtue depend entirely on consequences (Sinnott-
Armstrong 2015). Consider the Basic Consequentialist View of virtue (BCV): a trait is a virtue if and 
only if it has good consequences in some relevant way; a trait is a vice if and only if it has bad 
consequences in some relevant way. These definitions are basic because they are underspecified. 
A fully worked out account must provide answers to at least the following questions: what is 
good? How should we understand a trait’s ‘having’ a consequence? What kinds of traits can be 
virtues? Are expected or actual consequences the relevant ones? How good must the 
consequences be for a trait to be a virtue? What is virtue’s role in moral theory? Our aim is to 
                                                          
1 Some consequentialists may opt for eliminativism about virtue. After all, Jeremy Bentham (1843), a 
prominent consequentialist, eliminates “natural rights” form his broader moral theory calling them “nonsense upon 
stilts” precisely because his moral theory does not offer a good account of them. Why not think the same about 
virtue? We thank Folke Tersman for recommending that we include this option. In our view, there is a theoretical 
cost for consequentialists who eliminate virtue, because they ignore a central part of our moral experience. 
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analyze a prominent consequentialist’s answer to more detailed versions of these questions,2 and 
then point to a more plausible consequentialist account of virtue. 
We proceed as follows. First, we highlight some plausible features of the BCV, and then 
provide twelve questions to which a fully developed consequentialist account of virtue must 
provide answers. Second, we unpack Julia Driver’s (2001; 2004; 2006; 2016) consequentialist 
account of virtue in terms of those questions, because it is the most comprehensive and 
essentially consequentialist account of virtue on offer.3 We also point out how her development 
of the BCV makes it more attractive and then briefly explicate some objections to her view. 
Third, we consider and evaluate three modifications of Driver’s account suggested by Ben 
Bradley (2005; 2017; 2018), and, in so doing, we point to a more plausible consequentialist 
account of virtue.  
 
1. Motivations for the BCV and The Twelve Questions 
An attractive feature of the BCV of virtue is a feature that makes consequentialism in general 
attractive—namely, that moral properties are about promoting good. Another attractive feature 
of the BCV is that traits are virtues only if they promote good in the relevant way, which fits 
with Linda Zagzebski’s (1996: 136) assertion that virtue is a “success term.” Recently, 
experimental philosophers Adam Feltz and Edward Cokely (2013) have established that at least 
for those not trained in philosophy, whether a trait produces good is more important for its 
being a virtue than internal features of the trait such as its giving rise to pretheoretical good 
                                                          
2 Philosophers in the consequentialist tradition have embraced ideas that resemble the BCV to varying 
degrees including Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, Jeremy Bentham, Henry Sidgwick, and G. E. Moore. Those 
interested in this tradition should see the chapters on Hutcheson, Hume, and Mill in this volume; also see Bradley 
(2017) for a nice discussion of Moore’s account of virtue. 
3 Thomas Hurka’s (2001: 3-4) account of virtue as an intrinsically good attitude toward an intrinsic good is 
not essentially consequentialist: “It [this account of virtue] can be accommodated within … consequentialism. The 
account … can be extended in a deontological setting.” Furthermore, Driver’s view is purely consequentialist in a 
way that others are not. For example, Rosalind Hursthouse (1999) and Linda Zagzebski (1996) offer views of virtue 
that have a consequentialist necessary condition alongside at least one non-consequentialist necessary condition. 
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intentions or motivations. Insofar as these studies provide evidence for philosophical theories 
supported by such intuitions, this is good news for the BCV, because Feltz and Cokely highlight 
that producing good consequences is the more salient feature of a virtue for many people. This 
study, then, provides an opportunity for consequentialists to explain away the idea that a trait is a 
moral virtue only if it gives rise to pretheoretical good intentions and motivations, because it is 
the less salient feature of virtue. As we fill out various parts of the BCV, more attractive features 
come into view. For now, we turn to consider twelve questions that a fully specified 
consequentialist account of virtue must answer. 
The Good Question: What makes a good consequence? That is, what is the intrinsic good(s) 
that virtue promotes? 
The Relation Question: What is the ‘having’ relation between the trait relatum and the good 
consequence relatum? Is it a causal or non-causal relation?  
The Trait Nature Question: Must a virtue be a character trait—that is, a broad psychological 
disposition to feel, think, and act in certain ways in particular kinds of circumstances? Or can it 
be a psychologically thinner item such as a motive (Adams 1976) or attitude (Hurka 2001), or 
perhaps even a non-psychological trait such as eye color?4  
The Trait Psychology Question: If virtues must be psychological in character, do they require 
any particular psychology? Must, for example, a virtue be a “corrective” to natural selfishness 
(Foot 1978: 8)? Or, must a virtue be a character trait to form pretheoretical good intentions or 
motivations (Hursthouse 1999: 121-160; Zagzebski 1996: 77-136)? 
The Trait Scope Question: Is it only the consequences of an individual’s trait that counts 
toward that trait’s virtue status? Or do the consequences of all traits of the same type count 
toward the virtue status of all such traits?   
                                                          
4 See Halbig’s contribution in this volume. 
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The Internalist/Externalist Consequence Question: Are the consequences that determine virtue 
status objective and external to agency, or are they subjective, expected consequences? 
The Consequence Scope Question: Do both long and short-term consequences count toward 
the virtue status of a trait, or only short-term consequences? Are the consequences that count 
limited to the actual world, or do consequences in nearby possible worlds count too? 
The Maximizing Question: Must a virtue’s consequences be maximally good or merely 
surpass some non-maximal threshold? The exact nature of this threshold depends on the answer 
to the next question. 
The Contrast Question: Does the threshold specify a certain quantity of good that must be 
surpassed for a trait to be a virtue (for example, a virtue on balance produces more good than 
not)? Or does the threshold essentially involve a contrast to the good produced by other traits 
(for example, a virtue produces more good than other relevant traits)? 
The Overall/Average Question: Does the threshold specify the balance of good 
consequences as a sum total (overall) or as the mean of the sum total (average)? 
The Scalar Question: Are some virtues more morally valuable than others (for example, the 
better virtues produce more good)? Or are all virtues equally morally valuable? 
The Role Question: What role does virtue play in consequentialist moral theory with respect 
to right action? There are two options for the BCV. The indirect option is to understand right 
action by way of virtue; the right action to perform is the one that the relevant virtue prescribes. 
The direct option makes the rightness status of an action depend on the consequences of the 
action, and the virtue status of a trait depend on the consequences of the trait. 
These twelve questions are choice points for building a consequentialist account of virtue 
and for situating at least part of its role within a broader consequentialist moral theory. We turn 
our attention now to Driver’s consequentialist account of virtue.  
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2. Driver’s Account of Virtue 
Driver (2001: 82) defines a virtue as a “character trait that produces more good (in the actual 
world) than not systematically.” Driver (2001: 38-39, 104) defines moral virtue as a trait that 
produces good for others primarily, and a prudential virtue as a trait that produces good for its 
possessor. She (2001: 106), however, regards this distinction as “largely semantic”: “these traits 
[moral and prudential virtues] are all good-producing traits, and as such can be described as 
moral virtues.” Let us unpack her definition of virtue by using our twelve questions, and, in 
some cases, explore her rationale for making the choices that she makes.  
The Good Question: Driver (2001: 91-106) understands the good in terms of “social 
flourishing” that includes subjective and objective features, but she does not provide a full 
account. We read Driver’s claim about good consequences to include also the prevention of 
factors that thwart social flourishing. She (2001: 84-85) claims, for example, that at an earlier 
time, chastity was a virtue precisely because it prevented the occurrence of disastrous 
consequences. Symmetrically, then, bad consequences are those that bring about social 
languishing, and that prevent social flourishing. 
The Relation Question: Driver (2001: 82) often uses the language of a trait’s “producing” 
consequences. But in response to Onora O’Neill’s (2004: 8) objection that traits at least typically 
do not cause behaviour, Driver (2004: 35-36) revises her account by opting for the weaker ‘make 
a difference’ relation between a trait and its consequences. For simplicity, we retain the causal 
language with the caveat that she is committed only to difference making. 
The Trait Nature Question: Driver’s (2001: 68, 106-108) view is that only character traits 
can be virtues, and thus non-psychological traits such as eye color cannot be virtues.5 Although 
                                                          
5 If the claims made by some social psychologists and philosophers that character traits do not exist (“We 
need to abandon all talk of virtue and character, not find a way to save it by reinterpreting it” (Harman 2000: 224)) 
or that external circumstances wholly swallow the influence of character traits are true claims, then there would be 
no virtues or vices on Driver’s view. We, however, are skeptical about the truth of those claims; and most social 
psychologists and philosophers are skeptical about them too (see Miller 2014: 199-200). In fact, most acknowledge 
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most philosophers hold that virtues are necessarily character traits (see, for example, Aristotle 
2002, Calder 2007, Hursthouse 1999, Kant 1996, Miller 2014), it seems open for 
consequentialists who locate moral value wholly in external consequences to think that non-
psychological traits such as hair color can be virtues. Since Driver locates moral value entirely in 
external consequences, why does she go the standard way? Here is her explanation: “To hold 
that a virtue is a character trait is to recognize that virtue is something possessed only by 
creatures who have minds and characters” (2001: 108). But this rationale does not justify her 
position; it is compatible with good producing non-psychological traits in human beings being 
virtues. In contrast to her stated motivation, we find it plausible that Driver embraces the 
character trait requirement to accommodate pretheoretical intuitions about virtue.  
The Trait Psychology Question: Driver’s view is that nothing beyond a trait’s being a 
psychological disposition is required for it to be a moral virtue, at least with respect to the 
intrinsic nature of the trait (Driver 2001: 42-61; 2016). Thus, virtues need not be correctives to 
natural selfishness or be disposed to give rise to pretheoretical good intentions. Of course, a 
trait’s giving rise to pretheoretical good intentions is still an important part of its being a virtue 
precisely because good intentions reliably bring about good consequences. 
The Trait Scope Question: Consequences relevant for determining whether an individual’s 
character trait is a virtue are not limited to the consequences produced by that particular trait. 
Rather, the consequences of all people’s type-identical traits count toward their virtue statuses. 
We, however, qualify this answer in response to an upcoming question. 
 The Internalist/Externalist Consequence Question: The consequences relevant to making a 
trait a virtue are objective consequences that are external to agency, not subjective, expected 
consequences. Driver (2001: 68-78) opts for external consequences to preserve the relation 
                                                          
that we at least have local character traits that make a difference to behavior (Doris 2002: 64); more recently, Gilbert 
Harman (2003: 92) has agreed: “people may differ in certain relatively narrow traits”. 
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between virtue and the world. If her account were recast with expected good consequences, it 
would have the advantage of protecting a trait’s virtue status from luck, because modally fragile 
factors outside of the agent’s control could not influence the action’s consequences and thereby 
affect the trait’s virtue status. Driver’s response to the problem of luck, generated by her 
commitment to external consequences, is twofold. First, a trait must systematically produce good 
consequences to be a virtue, which typically precludes a trait from being a virtue on the basis of a 
mere fluky consequence (2001: 82). We return shortly to the nature of ‘systematicity’. Second, 
she views luck as a “fact of life” in a way that includes the moral life (2001: 83).6 
The Consequence Scope Question: Long-term consequences count toward a trait’s being a 
virtue (2001: 84), and the actual world is the limit for consequences that count (2001: 82). Thus, 
consequences produced in close possible worlds do not count. According to Driver (2001: 82), 
what happens in close possible worlds has very little practical significance, and “moral evaluation 
serves a practical function.”7 Within this actual world limit, however, Driver (2001: xvii, 85) 
introduces further contextually determined boundaries for what consequences count toward a 
trait’s virtue status. As a result, a trait might be a virtue relative to one actual context, but not 
relative to another. For example, aggression might have been a virtue in ancient times, but it is 
no longer so. “What determines the relevant context will … be factors that make focusing on 
one context rather than another useful” (2001: 85). Presumably, the idea is that contextual 
boundaries are drawn when different environments provide a good explanation for why the 
same type of trait gives rise to consequences with very different moral valences, which is what 
makes it so useful to distinguish the contexts. 
                                                          
6 Driver (2012) does not think that luck can affect every aspect of the moral life; for example, she argues 
that even the consequentialist can consistently hold the view that two identical reckless drivers are equally 
blameworthy even though only one of them kills a pedestrian. The idea is that the killer driver’s wrongdoing is more 
serious than the merely reckless driver’s wrongdoing, but they deserve the same degree of blame. For an 
introduction to the problem of moral luck and various attempts to solve it, see Hartman (2017: ch 1). 
7 For an argument that counterfactual consequences are practically significant, see Hartman (2015: 89-92). 
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The Maximizing Question: A virtue need not maximize good consequences (2001: 73-74), 
because that standard is too demanding. Rather, a trait is a virtue just in case it systematically 
produces more good than not. 
The Contrast Question: Driver’s threshold specifies a relative amount of good that a virtue 
produces (more good than not), and it makes no essential contrastive reference to the good 
produced by other traits.  
The Scalar Question: Some virtues are morally superior to others. The better ones are those 
that systematically produce better consequences (2001: 74).  
The Overall/Average Question: Driver does not address this question. In our view, the most 
plausible position for her to take is that a virtue produces more good than not on average. To 
see why, suppose for reductio that a virtue is a trait that produces more good than not overall 
and that wit happens to produce more good overall than justice simply because its more 
common and more commonly enacted. It follows that wit is a better virtue than justice, which is 
counterintuitive (Bradley 2005: 296). Plausibly, it is not a trait’s ubiquity or activation frequency 
that determines how good of a virtue it is, but rather how much good it produces on average 
each time it is enacted. It is noteworthy, however, that the average answer does not entirely solve 
this problem. Suppose, for example, that wit is activated only once with very good consequences; 
it may turn out that the average good produced by wit is greater than the average good produced 
by justice, and so wit is the better virtue in that world.8 The modification that we recommend at 
the end of this chapter mitigates this problem by widening the scope of consequences that count 
toward a trait’s being a virtue to nearby possible worlds, because it is plausible that wit would not 
also have such good consequences in nearby possible worlds. As a result, we think that the 
                                                          
8 We thank Erik Carlson for pressing this point. 
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average answer is more plausible, and that Driver has this in mind for her undefined 
‘systematicity’ requirement.9 
The Role Question: Virtue plays a direct role in moral theory, as does right action (Driver 
2001: 71-73; cf. Driver 2006). Thus, the moral quality of character traits and actions are 
determined by their own consequences; if virtue and right action statuses are determined by sets 
of consequences that are different enough, a virtue may occasionally produce a wrong action and 
a vice may sometimes produce a right action (cf. Adams 1976: 471).  
Here, then, is Driver’s account of virtue: a certain kind of character trait is a virtue 
relative to a context in a possible world if and only if character traits of that kind make a 
difference to producing more social flourishing than not on average in that context in that 
possible world. This view of virtue inherits the two plausible features of the BCV mentioned 
above. Consider four more possible benefits of Driver’s view. 
First, Driver’s (2001: 72) account can offer a partial explanation of ambivalence about 
hard cases for an act consequentialist. Act consequentialism is the view that an action is 
obligatory if and only if it produces more good than the other action options. A standard 
problem for this theory is that it sometimes prescribes intuitively unjust actions. For example, a 
sheriff must choose either to give up an innocent vagrant to a violent mob or stand by while the 
mob takes “justice” into its own hands. Stipulate the details of this case such that the action of 
giving up the vagrant produces the most good. But then, act consequentialism implies that it is 
obligatory for the sheriff to give up the vagrant, which is morally untoward. Driver’s account of 
virtue can help to explain what is morally untoward about it. It seems plausible that the sheriff 
with the virtues relevant to this decision (acting in character) would not have given up the 
innocent vagrant. That is, only a person with the vices relevant to this decision (acting in 
                                                          
9 At one point, Driver (2001: 95) equates “systematically” with “overall,” which we do not think is 
representative of her position on this issue. 
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character) would have given up the vagrant, because the dispositions involved in giving up an 
innocent person to an angry mob do not generally make for social flourishing. Thus, Driver’s 
account of virtue may provide the act consequentialist with a mitigating rejoinder to this kind of 
evaluational ambivalence. 
Second, Driver’s context sensitive account allows for character traits to change their 
moral status over time. One example that Driver (2001: 84-85) provides is that chastity used to 
be a virtue, because disastrous consequences lay in store for women who were not chaste. As 
birth control and paternity tests became available, however, those bad consequences were often 
averted. Driver concludes that chastity is no longer a virtue, because being unchaste no longer 
has bad consequences on balance. Driver’s consequentialist account, then, can explain changing 
societal attitudes toward chastity in terms of its changing virtue status. (For various criticisms of 
this motivation, see Adams 2006; Calder 2007; Hartman 2015). 
Third, Driver’s (2001: 53; 2016) account is more egalitarian than other prominent 
accounts of virtue, because Aristotle, Kant, and their followers put various knowledge and 
motivational requirements on virtue (see Aristotle 2002; Hursthouse 1999; Kant 1996; McDowell 
1979; Zagzebski 1996). Driver, however, does not make such requirements necessary, and so 
imperfect people with various kinds of moral ignorance and bad motivations can still be counted 
as having virtues. For example, Huck Finn believes that he ought to turn in the runaway slave 
Jim, but his sympathy precludes his doing so. Huck’s sympathy is a virtue, and his action is 
certainly the right one, even though he believes he is doing wrong and feels crushing guilt for 
running away with what he thinks is Miss Watson’s property. Driver believes that this judgment 
about Huck’s having the virtue of sympathy is exactly right. Still, one might wonder why 
egalitarianism is a merit for an account of virtue. For example, it is not a merit of an account of 
excellent health that it is less demanding and more people are thereby counted as healthy. (For 
more criticisms, see Adams 2006; Hartman 2015; Russell 2007; Slote 2004). 
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Fourth, Driver’s account gives an intuitive verdict on the virtue status of certain 
character traits involving ignorance. Driver contends that the character traits of modesty, blind 
charity, trust, forgiveness, and impulsive courage necessarily involve certain kinds of ignorance. 
For example, the modest person is ignorant (but not badly ignorant) of her own self-worth 
(2001: 19); the blindly charitable person is ignorant of various defects of others and focuses on 
their good qualities (2001: 28); the forgiving person forgets certain kinds of wrongs done to her 
and others (2001: 32). She also contends that these traits are intuitively virtues and that her 
account is well-suited to accommodate this contention, whereas other accounts are not due to 
their knowledge restrictions. Some evidence that she offers for their virtue status is that these 
traits are “valued … as traits that morally improve the character” of the individuals who possess 
them (2001: 36); of course, the decisive factor for her is that they systematically produce good in 
the relevant way. (For experimental philosophical support of their status as virtues, see Feltz and 
Cokely 2012. For several different criticisms, see Adams 2006; Flanagan 1990; Sandler 2005; 
Slote 2004; Winter 2012). 
Driver’s account of virtue, then, is attractive, because it focuses on social flourishing, 
preserves a necessary connection between virtue and the world, partially mitigates a certain kind 
of evaluational ambivalence, explains shifting virtue evaluations, is egalitarian, and counts 
modesty, blind charity, trust, forgiveness, and impulsive courage as virtues.  
Nevertheless, her account has been charged as having various counterintuitive 
implications. For example, a trait with pretheoretical bad psychology such as a disposition to 
enjoy hurting an innocent person is possibly a virtue if it happens to give rise to good 
consequences in the relevant way (Hartman 2015: 80-82; Slote 2004: 29-30; but see Driver 2001: 
56-62 for a response). Someone also can become a better or worse person by inadvertently 
traveling into another context, because changes in context can change the virtue status of her 
character traits and the virtue status of her character traits determine the degree to which she is a 
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good or bad person (Hartman 2015: 84-87). Furthermore, Driver’s account has been charged 
with theoretical problems. For example, it provides no common intrinsic structure to all the 
virtues and vices (Calder 2007: 209-213).10 Driver’s account also places no restrictions on how a 
person becomes virtuous, and it seems plausible that a person is not praiseworthy for a non-
voluntarily acquired virtue. But virtue is necessarily a property for which its possessor is 
praiseworthy (Zagzebski 1996: 101; but see Driver 2001: 10 for a response.) Finally, Driver 
collapses an intuitive distinction between a trait’s being good and its being a virtue. Intuitively, 
not all good producing traits are virtues; virtues are supposed to be excellences, not meager good 
producing traits.11 Indeed, Driver’s view seems to imply that almost all character traits are either 
virtues or vices! But instead of considering how Driver attempts or might attempt to explain 
away these counterintuitive implications and theoretical problems, we turn to consider three 
revisions of Driver’s account of virtue proposed by Bradley (2005; 2017; 2018) and evaluate 
whether someone sympathetic to Driver’s account should adopt them. 
 
3. The Pluralist Suggestion 
Driver answers The Trait Scope Question by making the consequences produced by all character 
traits of the same type count toward the virtue status of all those character traits.12 
Although Bradley thinks that Driver’s answer is correct, he also thinks it is odd in this 
way: “it may seem odd to say that whether it is a virtue for one person to have a character trait 
depends at all on the consequences of some other person or people having it” (2018: 401-402; 
                                                          
10 Hurka’s (2001) theory of virtue and vice is compatible with act consequentialism, and it makes virtue and 
vice intrinsically good and bad in ways that avoid the two counterintuitive implications and this theoretical 
objection. 
11 There is an analogous objection in the moral responsibility literature to views that collapse the intuitive 
distinction between being bad and being blameworthy (see Hartman forthcoming). 
12 Driver’s view functionally collapses into the view that only the consequences produced by a particular 
trait count toward its virtue status if there is only one instance of each type of trait instantiated in an actual context. 
This collapse may be the case given the complex nature of our character traits (see Miller 2014) if traits are 
individuated in very fine-grained ways. 
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italics in original). For example, suppose that honesty has good consequences for the general 
population but bad consequences for a diplomat in her capacity as a diplomat. Bradley thinks 
that there is a sense in which the diplomat’s honesty is not a virtue, even though there is another 
sense in which it is. He adopts a virtue pluralism such that the diplomat’s honesty is a virtue qua 
the consequences produced by all traits of this type and is a vice qua its own consequences. 
Bradley’s pluralism, however, strikes us as unattractive. The pretheoretical idea of virtue 
does not include a trait’s being a virtue or a vice strictly due to its own consequences (in addition 
to being a virtue or a vice due to the consequences of all the other instances of the same kind of 
trait), which is a mark against the pluralism. Why should someone sympathetic to Driver’s 
account care about the pretheoretical idea of virtue? Driver’s (2001: 62; 2004: 33) ambition is to 
provide an account of virtue that is better than its Aristotelian and Kantian rivals. And one 
criterion for measuring the plausibility of various conceptions of virtue against one another is to 
measure how well each conception accounts for the pretheoretical idea (Hartman 2015: 81). 
Thus, if a proposed revision of Driver’s account is at odds with the pretheoretical idea of virtue, 
we have a reason to reject the revision. Furthermore, adopting the pluralistic suggestion seems 
unnecessary, because two responses are open to Driver. First, although honesty gives rise to bad 
consequences in a person’s capacity as a diplomat, the trait could still be a virtue if it gives rise to 
enough good consequences in the broader population such that the bad consequences of the 
diplomat’s honesty are swamped. Second, if the diplomat’s context is different enough from the 
everyday context, perhaps it is fitting to say that honesty is a virtue relative to our everyday 
context but not the diplomat’s context. Either way, we do not recommend adopting the 
pluralistic suggestion. 
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4. The Contrastivist Suggestion 
Driver answers The Contrast Question by asserting that there is a relative quantitative standard 
with respect to whether a character trait is a virtue—namely, it must produce more good than 
not on average.  
Bradley (2005; 2017; 2018) argues that Driver’s account faces a difficulty based on this 
answer. Consider the following scenario:  
In Horribleland, resources are very scarce. Earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, and 
volcano eruptions cause nearly constant suffering for the inhabitants. 
Furthermore there are dangerous monsters everywhere that attack and kill 
people. Even the best possible character trait fails to bring about positive value 
overall; the best one can do is mitigate people’s suffering. … everyone in 
Horribleland is vicious. If someone in Horribleland devotes her life to preventing 
suffering and succeeds in preventing a lot of suffering (even if only a very tiny 
portion of the enormous suffering in that world), it would be very implausible to 
deny that she is virtuous even if she fails thereby to produce anything of positive 
intrinsic value (2017: 82). 
 
The problem is that Driver’s threshold simply cannot be reached in this kind of radical 
circumstance. As a result, a character trait such as compassion that strikes many people as a 
virtue would turn out to be a vice; in fact, the property of virtue is not even instantiated in 
Horribleland. 
Bradley contends that the consequentialist should jettison Driver’s threshold, because it 
gives the wrong verdict for compassion in Horribleland. He proposes a different answer to The 
Contrast Question: a character trait is a virtue if and only if it produces better consequences than 
alternative character traits in the relevant contrast class (2005: 286). This answer to The Contrast 
Question gets the right verdict in Horribleland, since it is not the case that compassion must 
produce more good than not on average to be a virtue; rather, compassion must merely produce 
more good on average than indifference, spite, cruelty, etc. 
Although we agree that the contrastivist suggestion would fix the problem, we think that 
the alleged problem disappears depending on how we understand Horribleland. On the one 
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hand, suppose that we understand Horribleland such that a person with compassion produces 
consequences that prevent more suffering than not on average, even though it does not produce 
positive consequences on average. As Driver (2001: 82) abstractly formulates her view, it appears 
that compassion would not be a virtue, because she asserts that a virtue must produce more 
good than not. Nevertheless, we think Driver is best read as holding the view that good 
consequences include not only positive consequences but also the prevention of negative 
consequences. After all, chastity was supposed to be a virtue by Driver’s lights precisely because 
it prevented bad consequences. But then, it is plausible to think that compassion is a virtue even 
in Horribleland, which is the desired result.13 
On the other hand, suppose that we simply stipulate the details of Horribleland such that 
all character traits including compassion produce bad consequences on average even when we 
allow consequences that prevent suffering to count as good. In that case, Horribleland is such an 
extreme circumstance that it is plausible that there are no virtues in Horribleland, because it is 
common to think that having a virtue requires cooperation from the world. Neo-Aristotelians 
such as Rosalind Hursthouse (1999) and Linda Zagzebski (1996), for example, would not think 
that virtue is to be found in Horribleland, because they think that virtue requires not only good 
internal psychology but also the production of good consequences. Even Aristotle (NE 
1179b23-31) held that certain external requirements were necessary to becoming virtuous such as 
being habituated by the right kind of family in the right kind of society (cf. Nussbaum 2001: chs. 
11-12). Thus, it is not surprising that there are no virtues in Horribleland. The upshot is that the 
move to contrastivism is unmotivated by the considerations to which Bradley appeals.14 
 
                                                          
13 This move is not available to consequentialists who specify the good in a way that precludes the 
prevention of suffering from being good. We thank Vuko Andrić for this point. 
14 We can, however, see other motivations for contrastivism. For example, one might adopt it to 
circumvent our objection that Driver’s account cannot make the intuitive distinction between a meager good 
producing trait and a virtue. One might also adopt it to circumvent an objection raised in conversation by Krister 
Bykvist: if someone’s being a good or bad person is determined by their virtues and vices, then everyone in 
Horribleland is a bad person, which is a counterintuitive result. 
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5. The Counterfactual Suggestion 
Driver’s answer to The Consequence Scope Question is that the consequences that count toward 
a trait’s actually being a virtue are limited to those that occur in the actual world, and so 
consequences in nearby possible worlds are irrelevant to its virtue status.  
This feature of Driver’s account has provoked various objections about how luck affects 
the virtue status of character traits (see, for example, Calder 2007: 204-208; Hartman 2015: 84; 
Slote 2004: 30). Bradley (2005: 292-294) nicely highlights three ways in which this is so. First, 
suppose that Lucky is malicious and that he is the only person in the world (or his context) with 
that disposition. He sneezes when he attempts to insult others, plump birds block his bullets, and 
his internet trolling is always received ironically. Since Lucky’s malice never has bad 
consequences, it is not a vice, which is counterintuitive. Second, suppose that there is a world in 
which no one is in need, and so the instantiated trait helpfulness is never enacted. In such a 
world, helpfulness produces no good states of affairs, and so it is not a virtue, which is also 
counterintuitive. Third, suppose that super-benevolence is an uninstantiated property. Because 
super-benevolence does not actually produce good, it is not a virtue, which is again 
counterintuitive. These examples illustrate general ways in which Driver’s account of virtue is 
counterintuitively subject to luck.  
The consequentialist can respond to the luck argument in various ways. One could 
answer The Internalist/Externalist Consequence Question differently by asserting that it is only 
expected consequences that count. Because it is plausible for Lucky to expect his malice to have 
bad consequences, this revised version of Driver’s account may appear to avoid the luck 
problem. In fact, however, this proposed revision does not avoid the luck problem, because it 
seems plausible that consequence-less helpfulness and uninstantiated super-benevolence are not 
traits that people actually expect to have good consequences. 
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A more promising way to mitigate the impact of luck is to provide a different answer to 
The Consequence Scope Question. Instead of limiting the consequences that count to those that 
occur in the actual world, broaden the scope of consequences that count to include those that 
are produced in nearby possible worlds (Bradley 2005; Hartman 2015). So, even if Lucky’s malice 
produces no actual harm, he plausibly succeeds in harming his targets in nearby worlds. Thus, 
Lucky’s malice would be a vice on the more permissive limit on consequences, which accords 
with our intuitions. Additionally, even if there is no opportunity to be helpful in the actual world, 
there could be such opportunities in nearby possible worlds, and if so, helpfulness would be a 
virtue. Lastly, even if super-benevolence is not actually instantiated, it could be instantiated in 
nearby possible worlds, and if it is instantiated, super-benevolence would be a virtue. Thus, 
broadening the consequences that count to nearby possible worlds mitigates the influence of 
luck on the virtue status of traits.  
One might object that if we take the intuitions seriously that luck should not determine 
whether a trait is a virtue or vice in these cases (and so, malice should be a vice, helpfulness a 
virtue, and super-benevolence a virtue), then we should take seriously the anti-luck intuition that 
compassion is a virtue in Horribleland. Our response differs depending on how we understand 
Horribleland. First, if we understand Horribleland such that compassion produces consequences 
that prevent more suffering than not on average, compassion would be a virtue, and the 
objection is avoided. Second, if we just stipulate that compassion produces bad consequences on 
average in Horribleland, compassion is a vice due to bad circumstantial luck. We, however, 
contend that compassion’s failing to be a virtue is not lucky (Hartman 2015: 86-89). After all, it is 
common to hold that an actual occurring event is lucky only if it fails to occur in a broad range of 
nearby possible worlds in which the relevant initial conditions are the same (see Levy 2011; Peels 
2019; Pritchard 2019).15 Plausibly, the circumstances of Horribleland are modally stable such that 
                                                          
15 For explication of various conceptions of luck, see Church and Hartman (2019). 
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compassion also fails to produce good on average in at least most nearby possible worlds, and 
thus compassion’s failure to be a virtue is not lucky. If, however, those horrible circumstances 
are not modally stable and compassion produces on average good consequences in a broad range 
of nearby possible worlds, then it would turn out to be a virtue even in Horribleland, and so 
there is no inconsistency in our treatment of anti-luck intuitions. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
We offered twelve salient questions that must be answered to provide a full consequentialist 
account of virtue and its role in moral theory. Subsequently, we explicated Driver’s account and 
highlighted various advantages and criticisms. Finally, we considered pluralist, contrastivist, and 
counterfactualist revisions of her account, and argued that the best version of her view is revised 
in such a way as to allow consequences in nearby possible worlds to count toward the virtue 
status of actual character traits.16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
16 We thank the participants of higher seminars at the University of Gothenburg, Stockholm University, 
and Uppsala University for questions and comments, and we especially thank Vuko Andrić, Krister Bykvist, and 
Felix Timmermann for extensive comments. 
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